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Abstract From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that
judgements of the form ‘x is probable’ only make sense if one assumes there to be a
ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). With-
out this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other
than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis’s idea, calling it “a rem-
nant of rationalism”. The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying
Reichenbach to produce a regress of probability values that yields a number other than
zero. Reichenbach never took up the challenge, but we will meet it on his behalf, as
it were. By presenting a series converging to a limit, we demonstrate that x can have
a definite and computable probability, even if its justification consists of an infinite
number of steps. Next we show the invalidity of a recent riposte of foundationalists
that this limit of the series can be the ground of justification. Finally we discuss the
question where justification can come from if not from a ground.
Keywords Foundationalism · Reichenbach · Probability
1 Introduction
In the debate between epistemic foundationalists and anti-foundationalists, Hans
Reichenbach is clearly on the side of the latter. Already in his discussions with
early logical positivists, Reichenbach’s anti-foundationalist stance is noticeable: he
rejects the positivistic idea that a theoretical sentence is equivalent to a set of obser-
vational sentences, arguing instead for a connection in terms of probability relations
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(Reichenbach 1938). Reichenbach’s anti-foundationalism is, however, most obvious
in his debate with the American logician and epistemologist C. I. Lewis (1883–1964).
The disagreement extended over more than two decades, from 1930 until 1952, and it
is well-documented in letters and in contributions to journals.
Both Lewis and Reichenbach agree that epistemic justification is probabilistic in
character: both believe that it makes sense to say that a proposition or a belief justifies
another proposition or belief, even if the former does not logically imply the latter but
merely gives probabilistic support. However, Lewis insists that probabilistic justifica-
tion only makes sense if it springs from a ground that is not merely probable, but is
certain. Reichenbach disagrees, holding that probabilistic justification remains coher-
ent, even if it is not rooted in firm ground. In the present article we analyse the debate
(Sects. 2–4), and explain its relevance to contemporary epistemology (Sects. 5–7).
We start in Sect. 2 by describing the basic difference between Lewis and Rei-
chenbach. In Sect. 3 we explain Lewis’s main argument for his claim that probability
judgements presuppose certainties, namely that any regress of probability judgements,
justified by probability judgements ad infinitum, has the absurd consequence of always
yielding zero. Reichenbach explains to Lewis that this argument is flawed; but, as we
will see, he is unable to convince his opponent. Rather, Lewis challenges Reichenbach
to produce a counterexample, i.e., a particular regress of probability judgements that
yields a number other than zero. Reichenbach never took up the challenge, but we will
meet it in Sect. 4. By presenting a series that converges to a nonzero limit, we dem-
onstrate that a probability judgement can have a definite, reasonable and computable
value, even if its justification is infinitely postponed in the sense that it consists of an
infinite number of steps. In this manner we show that Reichenbach, not Lewis, was
correct, thereby also refuting later claims of Van Cleve (1977) and Legum (1980).
In Sects. 5 and 6 we discuss further the relevance of the Lewis–Reichenbach de-
bate to present-day foundationalism. We first explain a recent riposte, which claims
that foundationalism can be consistent with an infinite series of reasons. The riposte
involves a particular example of a series which, although infinite, is claimed neverthe-
less to be foundational. We argue that the example is flawed for three reasons. First,
its structure is quite different from a standard epistemic chain. Second, it is based on
a confusion between the outcome of an infinite series and its origin. Third, and most
seriously, the series in question implies that the probability of the target proposition is
always one, independently of the nature and probability of the purported foundation.
Finally, in Sect. 7, we address the question whence epistemic justification can spring
if not from a primordial source.
2 Reichenbach versus Lewis
In his first major work, Mind and the World-Order. An Outline of a Theory of Knowl-
edge (1929), Lewis starts from the traditional view that our knowledge is partly math-
ematical and partly empirical. The mathematical part deals with knowledge that is a
priori and analytic, the empirical part concerns our knowledge of nature. The crucial
issue for any theory of knowledge, according to Lewis, is the character and the valid-
ity of empirical knowledge. Since “all empirical knowledge is probable only” (ibid.,
123
Synthese (2011) 181:113–124 115
p. 309), the essential problem for a theory of knowledge is “that of the validity of our
probability judgements” (ibid., p. 308).
A recurring theme in Mind and the World Order is that probability judgements only
make sense if they are based on grounds that are certain:
The validity of probability judgements rests upon truths which must be certain.
(ibid., p. 311)
…the immediate premises are, very likely, themselves only probable, and per-
haps in turn based upon premises only probable. Unless this backward-leading
chain comes to rest finally in certainty, no probability-judgment can be valid at
all. (ibid., pp. 328–329)
From a letter that Lewis writes to Reichenbach on 26 August 1930, we can infer that
Reichenbach had questioned these claims 1 month earlier, in a letter to Lewis that is
now lost. Whatever the precise content of Reichenbach’s letter may have been, it is
clear that it did not convince Lewis. For 16 years later, in An Analysis of Knowledge
and Valuation, Lewis stresses the same point again:
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain. The data which
themselves support a genuine probability, must themselves be certainties. (Lewis
1946, p. 186)
The disagreement between Lewis and Reichenbach reached its height in December
1951, when, at the 48th meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
Association at Bryn Mawr College, Reichenbach and Lewis both read papers relevant
to this dispute. These papers were subsequently published in the The Philosophical
Review of April 1952. In Lewis’s contribution we read that he sticks to his guns:
The supposition that the probability of anything whatever always depends on
something else which is only probable itself, is flatly incompatible with the
assignment of any probability at all. (Lewis 1952, p. 173)
Reichenbach, as is clear, strongly disagrees with this foundationalist claim. Already in
his major epistemological work, Experience and Prediction, he found an apt metaphor
to summarize his own anti-foundationalist position:
All we have is an elastic net of probability relations, floating in open space.
(Reichenbach 1938, p. 192)
Lewis’s claim that this is not so, and that probabilities must be grounded in certainties,
is called by Reichenbach “just one of those fallacies in which probability theory is so
rich” (Reichenbach 1952, p. 152). In an attempt to understand the root of the fallacy
Reichenbach writes:
We argue: if events are merely probable, the statement about their probability
must be certain, because …Because of what? I think there is tacitly a conception
involved according to which knowledge is to be identified with certainty, and
probable knowledge appears tolerable only if it is embedded in a framework of
certainty. This is a remnant of rationalism. (Reichenbach 1952, p. 152)
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Lewis, in turn, rejects the accusation of being an old fashioned rationalist and replies
that, on the contrary, he is trying to save empiricism from what he calls a modernized
coherence theory like that of his opponent (Lewis 1952, pp. 171, 173). He writes:
…[Reichenbach’s] probabilistic conception strikes me as supposing that if enough
probabilities can be got to lean against one another they can all be made to stand
up. I suggest that, on the contrary, unless some of them can stand up alone, they
will all fall flat. (Lewis 1952, p. 173)
In an attempt to arbitrate the matter, we will in Sect. 3 look at the argument with which
Lewis defends his claim that probabilities presuppose grounds that are certain.
3 Lewis’s argument
Lewis’s argument, as it appears in Mind and the World Order, is the following:
Nearly all the accepted probabilities rest upon more complex evidence than the
usual formulations suggest; what are accepted as premises are themselves not
certain but highly probable. Thus our probability judgement, if made explicit,
would take the form: the probability that A is B is a/b, because if P is Q, then
the probability that A is B is m/n, and the probability of ‘P is Q’ is p/q (where
m/n × p/q = a/b). But this compound character of probable judgement offers
no theoretical difficulty for their validity, provided only that the probability of
the premises, when pushed back to what is more and more ultimate, somewhere
comes to rest in something certain. (Lewis 1929, pp. 327–328)
So Lewis’s argument amounts to this. He first stresses that the statement ‘the proba-
bility that A is B is a/b’ or
P(‘A is B’) = a/b (1)
is elliptical for ‘the probability that A is B is m/n, if P were Q, but the probability
that P is Q is p/q’. In symbols:
P(‘A is B’) = P(‘A is B’|‘P is Q’) P(‘P is Q’)
= (m/n) × (p/q)
= a/b. (2)
Now of course the probability that P is Q may also be elliptical. If this series were to go
on and on, then, because all the factors in the multiplication are probabilities (positive
numbers less than one), the probability of the original proposition ‘A is B’ would
always tend to zero. But this is ridiculous, so the series of probability judgements
must come to a stop in a statement that is certain.
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Lewis’s argument is, however, simply mistaken. For P(‘A is B’) is not elliptical for
the product P(‘A is B’|‘P is Q’) P(‘P is Q’), but is elliptical for the sum of products
P(‘A is B’|‘P is Q’) P(‘P is Q’)
+ P(‘A is B’|not-‘P is Q’) P(not-‘P is Q’). (3)
Lewis forgets that, if the probability of ‘A is B’ is conditioned by the probability of
‘P is Q’, then you can only calculate the probability of ‘A is B’ if you also take into
account what the probability of ‘A is B’ is in case ‘P is Q’ is false.
Almost 20 years later, Bertrand Russell also champions the Lewisian claim that
probabilities require grounds that are certain. It is interesting, to say the least, that
he defends this claim with exactly the same erroneous argument that Lewis had used
(Russell 1948 , pp. 433–435). Reichenbach notices this and he explains it to Russell
in a letter on 28 March 1949 (Reichenbach and Cohen 1978, pp. 405–411). Three
weeks later, on the 22nd of April, Russell sends a reply in which he acknowledges his
mistake.
Lewis, however, seems to have persisted in the error of his ways, and Reichenbach
confronts him with this fact in 1951, at the 48th meeting of the APA at Bryn Mawr.
Lewis appears however not to be impressed by Reichenbach’s amendment. Apparently
failing to see the relevance of the second term in (3), he simply states:
I disbelieve that this will save [Reichenbach’s] point. For that, I think he must
prove that, where any regress of probability-values is involved, the progressively
qualified fraction measuring the probability of the quaesitum will converge to
some determinable value other than zero; and I question whether such a proof
can be given. (Lewis 1952, p. 172)
In other words, Lewis simply does not believe that an infinite regress of probabili-
ties can converge to some value other than zero. Even if we do take Reichenbach’s
amendment into account, then for Lewis it is still the case that an infinite series of
probability statements conditioned by probability statements will always converge to
zero. And he defies Reichenbach to prove the contrary. Reichenbach never took up the
challenge, but in the next section we will do so, as it were on Reichenbach’s behalf.
4 Meeting Lewis’s challenge
Reichenbach in fact corrects Lewis and Russell by citing a theorem that follows directly
from the probability axioms. For Eq. 3 is an instance of the rule of total probability:
P(E0) = P(E0|E1)P(E1) + P(E0|¬E1)P(¬E1), (4)
where E0 = ‘A is B’ and E1 = ‘P is Q’. If E1 itself is only probable, grounded in
E2 = ‘R is S’, then formula (4) must be iterated, and this produces a much more com-
plicated regression than the simple product that Russell and Lewis had envisaged.
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Below we will give an example in which Eq. 4 is iterated infinitely many times. We
will show that, even when the iteration is infinite, it need not converge to zero.1
Let P(E0) in Eq. 4 be the probability that a man will have a certain hereditary
disorder. Let P(E0|E1) be the conditional probability that he will have the complaint,
given that his father had it. Under the assumption that not all people with this disorder
have fathers with a similar affliction, P(E0|¬E1) is not zero. On the other hand, we
know that a man is more likely to contract the disorder if his father had it than if he
did not. That means that 1 > P(E0|E1) > P(E0|¬E1) > 0, and we may assume
that approximate empirical values of these two probabilities have been estimated from
the study of large populations. With α = P(E0|E1) and β = P(E0|¬E1), we may
rewrite formula (4) in the form
P(E) = αP(E1) + β(1 − P(E1))
= αP(E1) + β − β P(E1)
= β + (α − β)P(E1). (5)
P(E1) is the probability that the father had the disorder, and of course this probability
can be in turn conditioned by the fact that his father did, or did not similarly suffer.
Thus we have
P(E1) = β + (α − β)P(E2),
where P(E2) is the probability that the man’s paternal grandfather contracted the
infirmity. Of course, the value of P(E2) is calculated in the same way, giving:
P(E2) = β + (α − β)P(E3),
where P(E3) is the probability that the man’s paternal great-grandfather contracted
it. After n steps we have:
P(E0) = β + β(α − β) + β(α − β)2 + · · ·
+β(α − β)n + (α − β)n+1 P(En+1). (6)
The remainder term in Eq. 6, (α − β)n+1 P(En+1), is the product of two factors. The
factor P(En+1) is the probability that the primal grandfather had the disease. The
other factor, (α − β)n+1, gets smaller as n gets bigger, and in the limit that n goes to
infinity, (α−β)n+1 tends to zero. But if (α−β)n+1 tends to zero, the entire remainder
term dwindles away to nothing. In other words, with an infinite number of steps, the
remainder term vanishes and what remains is the infinite series
1 See also Sect. 4 of Atkinson and Peijnenburg (2006) .
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P(E0) = β + β(α − β) + β(α − β)2 + . . .




(α − β)n . (7)
Since 0 < α − β < 1, this geometric series is convergent and its sum is
P(E0) = β1 − α + β . (8)
And this is certainly not zero. For example, if α = 0.8 and β = 0.05, then the value
of P(E0) is 0.2. Conclusion: Lewis is mistaken. It is not the case that an infinite
series of probability statements conditioned on probability statements always tends to
zero—we have just seen an example of such a series that does not do so.2
5 A foundationalist reply
Contemporary foundationalists are of course very different from Lewis, yet they resem-
ble him in some of their views. For example, like Lewis many have a probabilistic view
of epistemic justification. They believe that it makes sense to say that En+1 justifies
En even if the former does not logically imply the latter; it is enough if En+1 only
probabilistically supports En (with respect to some measure and with some degree
of epistemic support). Moreover, like Lewis, they feel uneasy when confronted by a
series in which the epistemic support is continued ad infinitum, never reaching firm
ground. Presumably most of them will not fall into the trap of thinking that an infinite
regress of probability values must yield zero, but they do have the feeling that such a
regress is incoherent in one way or another. And this feeling should of course not come
as a surprise. After all, what could be more central to foundationalism than the claim
that there has to be a foundation, a last member that serves as the basis of the entire
edifice, the source from which the whole justification springs? This foundation may
be a certainty, as it is in Lewis’s philosophy, or a fixed probability, as it is for moderate
foundationalists, or a probability that is not fixed, as it is for so-called weak founda-
tionalists (Bonjour 1985). But however he twists and turns, a genuine foundationalist
seems attached to a foundation, a last link in the chain.
Nevertheless there have recently been foundationalists who argue that an epistemic
chain need not have a last link. John Turri, for example, writes:
A series of reasons, supporting a belief in a questioned non-evident proposition,
need not have a last member in order to have a foundational (properly basic)
member. …Foundationalism is consistent with there being available …an infi-
nite, non-repeating series of reasons, of the sort the infinitist prizes. In other
2 The objection that the series in our example is not really infinite, because it starts off with a primal
grandfather, begs the question. For a primal grandfather does not enter the scene as a deus ex machina: he
has ancestors too, in the form of primates, vertebrates, invertebrates, etc., eventually going back to the Big
Bang. And the question is precisely whether that was the beginning, indeed whether there was a beginning.
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words, foundationalists needn’t limit themselves to a finite series of reasons.
(Turri 2009, pp. 162–163)
Here is Turri’s example of an infinite series that he claims to be compatible with
foundationalism:
Suppose that Fran sees that it is 2:05. Suppose further that she practices a ver-
sion of foundationalism according to which such external-world beliefs can be
properly basic, and that in the present case her belief that it is 2:05 satisfies all
the relevant criteria. Now Fran asserts that it is past 2:00 …She …believes it
is past 2:00 because it is past 2:04 …why think that it is past 2:04? Because it is
past 2:04:30. Why think that? Because it is past 2:04:45 …But proceeding this
way ensures that she will approach the limit of, but never arrive at, 2:05. In other
words, she has available to her an infinite series of non-repeating reasons, each of
which is entailed by its successor. Moreover, the foundationalist has a principled
story to tell about how each member of this infinite series gets justified for her:
namely she can see that it is 2:05! (ibid., p. 163)
In other words, Turri claims that the limit serves as the ground of the infinite and
convergent series. Is that tenable?
6 Limits as grounds?
There are three things that should be noted about Turri’s example. The first is that it is
not a standard epistemic chain. When infinite, a standard epistemic chain has the form
E0 ←− E1 ←− E2 ←− E3 . . . . . .∞, (9)
where each link En is justified by En+1. Turri’s idea is that the whole infinite chain is
supported by the basic belief , and thus has the form
E0 ←− E1 ←− E2 ←− E3 . . . . . . ←− . (10)
But in fact the structure of Turri’s example is quite different. It may be pictured as
follows:
E0 ←− E1 ←− E2 ←− E3 . . .
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
   
(11)
where  is Fran’s basic belief “It is 2:05”, and where
E0: “It is past 2:00”
E1: “It is past 2:04”
E2: “It is past 2:04:30”
E3: “It is past 2:04:45”
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and so on. In (11), each En is entailed by En+1, just as was the case in the array (10).
In contrast to (10), however, in (11)  directly entails each of the En separately; rather
than an epistemic chain, (11) constitutes an infinite number of single implications, all
having the same antecedent, . The fact that each En is also entailed by En+1 does
not add anything at all to its credibility.
The second remark to be made about Turri’s example concerns his use of the term
‘limit’. Normally, the limit denotes the value or outcome of a series when its length
grows beyond all bounds, not its origin. In casu this refers to the probability of the
non-evident target proposition E0. In the Fran example, however, Turri tries to identify
the limit with the alleged origin of the series, namely . He thereby confuses the result
of an infinite series with its supposed initiator.
The third and final thing we may note about the Fran example is that  entails each
En , which is more than merely making each En more probable. Similarly, the relation
between En+1 and En is that of logical implication rather than of probabilistic support.
With the notation αn = P(En|En+1) and βn = P(En|¬En+1), we have αn = 1, since
En is entailed by En+1. However, βn could be nonzero. After all, En can be true when
En+1 is false. If it were not the case that En could be true when En+1 is false, the
structure would not be that of entailment, but bi-entailment. We would not just have
En+1 −→ En , but also En −→ En+1. Such bi-entailment would be equivalent to
having αn = 1 and βn = 0.
Be that as it may, in Turri’s scenario it is certainly the case that βn is not zero. Take
for example β0 = P(E0|¬E1). If E1 were false, i.e., if it were not the case that it is
past 2:04, E0 could still be true, for it might be 2:02, for example, and then it would
indeed be past 2:00. So β0 is greater than zero, and the same goes for each of the βn .
However, when αn = 1 and βn > 0, there are serious consequences if the chain is of
infinite length. For an infinite chain will then always lead to the conclusion that the
target belief E0, or in Turri’s words the “belief in a questioned non-evident proposi-
tion”, has probability unity. This in itself is not bad news for Turri, for he works after
all with implication, and not with probabilistic support. What is, however, disastrous
for his claim is that P(E0) = 1 quite independently of what  is. Indeed, even if 
were replaced by not- = ‘It is not past 2:05’, the infinite chain would still lead to
certainty. This can be further elucidated as follows.
Appealing once more to the rule of total probability, now in the form
P(En) = P(En|En+1)P(En+1) + P(En|¬En+1)P(¬En+1),
we find that
P(¬En) = P(¬En|¬En+1)P(¬En+1), (12)
with use of P(En|En+1) = 1. 3 The relation (12) can be iterated from n = 0 to n = s:
3 The steps in the derivation of Eq. 12 are
P(En) = P(En+1) + P(En |¬En+1)P(¬En+1)
1 − P(En) = 1 − [P(En+1) + P(En |¬En+1)P(¬En+1)]
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What happens as we take s to infinity? P(En|¬En+1) is not 0, as we noted, therefore,
P(¬En|¬En+1) is a positive number less than 1, since the sum of P(En|¬En+1)
and P(¬En|¬En+1) equals 1. When s in (13) tends to infinity, the product of factors
between the parentheses has an infinite number of terms, each less than one. In this
limit the product will normally be zero. But of course, this means that the whole right
hand side of (13) equals zero. From this it follows that P(¬E0) = 0 and thus that
P(E0) = 1.4
Far from supporting Turri’s hope that his infinite chain can serve the foundational-
ist’s purpose, the above reasoning has provided ammunition for an infinitist new-style
(see Peijnenburg 2007). For, in complete accordance with the Weltanschauung of the
latter, we have here a proposition that is entailed (up to measure zero) by an infinite
chain of conditional probabilities.5 No anchoring of the infinite sequence of proposi-
tions to a basic belief is required. Nor is it possible, as we have just shown.
7 Where then does the justification come from?
If the justification of a target proposition by means of an infinite regress of epistemic
support does not come from a basic belief, where does it come from? How can we
make sense of the idea that there can be justification without a ground?
The answer is that the justification by an infinite chain comes entirely from the
conditional probabilities that constitute its links. We do not need a single source from
which justification springs in order to have justificatory relations between beliefs or
propositions. Recall the manner in which we (probabilistically) justified a non-evi-
dent target proposition E0: we calculated its unconditional probability on the basis of
a series of conditional probabilities. If the series is finite, then there is a last link, a basic
belief that constitutes the starting point of the chain. Part of the justification comes
from this basic belief and part comes from the conditional probabilities that connect
the basic belief to the target proposition. If the chain is very long but still finite, the
Footnote 3 continued
= 1 − P(En+1) − P(En |¬En+1)P(¬En+1)
P(¬En) = P(¬En+1) − P(En |¬En+1)P(¬En+1)
= [1 − P(En |¬En+1)]P(¬En+1)
= P(¬En |¬En+1)P(¬En+1).
4 In general a product like the one in Eq. 13 could fail to tend to zero in the limit that s tends to infinity,
but only if the conditional probabilities tend very rapidly to unity as n tends to infinity. In the normal case,
however, and certainly if the conditional probabilities have a uniform upper bound that is less than 1, the
infinite product is zero.
5 A special case of this result can be obtained from the example (7), in which the conditional probabilities
were the same from step to step of the iteration. It suffices to set α = 1 in Eq. 8 to obtain P(E0) = 1, on
condition that β = 0.
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justificatory role of the basic belief diminishes while the combined contribution of the
conditional probabilities to the justification increases. The longer the chain becomes,
the less the justification by the basic belief and the more the justification provided by
the conditional probabilities. This is no surprise, for the conditional probabilities do
not arise out of thin air: they are part and parcel of the epistemic chain. If the series
is infinite (and convergent), then all of the justification is carried by the conditional
probabilities, and none by the basic belief. Indeed, the basic belief has then become
completely irrelevant.
It is instructive to illustrate our answer by means of another example. Consider an
inheritable trait, T, conducive to survival in a particular environment, which a girl is
sure to have if her mother had it. Suppose though that the child might also carry T if
her father had it, whether or not mother did so. Thus the probability that the child has
T, given that mother has T, is 1; but the probability that she has T if mother lacks T is
not zero, since there is a chance after all that father has T (assuming that there is no
other way that the child can get T). In terms of our symbolism, this situation satisfies
αn = P(En|En+1) = 1 and βn = P(En|¬En+1) > 0, where En is the proposition
that a female in the nth generation carries T, and En+1 is the proposition that her
mother has T. So the structure of the example is formally the same as it was in Turri’s
example.6
The new example has the advantage that further investigation will yield insight into
the origin of the justification of the claim that a given girl has the inheritable trait,
as symbolized by P(E0) = 1. The probability that a girl has T is greater than the
probability that mother had T (on condition that the latter probability is not 1) simply
because there is a nonzero probability that father carries T. The probability that the
child has T is even greater than the probability that her maternal grandmother had T,
since the possibilities are more numerous: there are after all three other grandparents,
each of whom could be a T-carrier. It is intuitively clear—reaching further and further
back into the family tree—that the genetic condition of a great-great-grandmother in
the nth ancestral generation contributes less and less, as n increases, to the probability
that the girl has T. In the formal limit of an infinite number of generations, all the
contributions to the probability that the child has T are coming from the conditional
probabilities: the contribution of a remote ancestress diminishes more and more as the
ancestress is further and further away, until she is hidden in the mists of time and her
influence has vanished completely.7
A final worry seems to remain. If a basic belief about a primal grandfather or a first
ancestress has no influence on the probability of our target proposition, then how could
our chain of reasons apply to the world? Are we not, in concluding that all epistemic
support comes from conditional probabilities, detaching our epistemic chain from the
real world around us? And if so, how can we distinguish our reasonings from those
6 In Turri’s example there is of course also , which is absent here; but, as we have explained, in infinite
series the justificatory role of basic beliefs such as  is nihil.
7 The fact that the child is sure to carry T, in the case that the number of generations is infinite, is a con-
sequence of the assumption that it is certain that she will carry T if her mother does so. If this conditional
probability is reduced, the unconditional probability that the child carries T is also reduced (cf. Eq. 8 for
the case that the conditional probabilities are the same from generation to generation).
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occurring in fiction, in the machinations of a liar, or in the hallucinations of a heroin
addict? In terms of our example: how can we ever distinguish the story about a real
trait T from a fairy tale with the same structure in which, instead of T, there is an
inheritable magical power M to turn a prince into a frog?
The distinction is not far to seek. It lies in the mundane fact that in the former,
but not in the latter, the conditional probabilities connect to that possible world which
is the actual world. Research in many empirical case studies might have established
that all T-carriers had at least one parent who carried T. In the fairy tale, on the other
hand, the only ‘evidence’ that M is inheritable is contained in the story itself—outside
the tale there is no evidence at all. We realise that this answer will not convince the
confirmed sceptic, but our opponent after all is the foundationalist, not the sceptic.
To our friend the foundationalist we say: the fact that conditional probabilities are
connected to the real world does not imply that they must have an origin in the sense
of a basic belief. An infinite series of conditional probabilities can refer to the real
world without their being tied to an unconditional probability. Some foundationalists
might not be convinced, objecting that an appeal to notions like ‘as applying to the
real world’, ‘outside evidence’ and ‘empirical case studies’ only makes sense within
a framework of foundationalism. But if all that is left of foundationalism is the accep-
tance of estimated empirical conditional probabilities, then perhaps even Reichenbach
might have joined the foundationalist club.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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